Practical photon sources are weak coherent sources so that multiphoton pulses are inevitable.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution(QKD) is a physically secure method, by which private key can be created between two partners, Alice and Bob, who share a quantum channel and a public authenticated channel. Security of the QKD is based on that one can not distinguish two nonorthogonal states. Another equivalent description is that one can not clone an unknown state. In QKD, this implies that an eavesdropper-Eve can not gain Alice and Bob's information without introducing some additional quantum bit error rate (QBER).
The pioneer work in QKD is presented by Bennett and Brassward in 1984 (BB84) , which is desired as the first scheme that can be utilized commercially in quantum information field.
The BB84 protocol uses four quantum states that constitute two bases, for example, the in one of the two bases, chosen at random (using a random-number generator independent from that of Alice). At this point, whenever they use the same basis, they get perfectly correlated results. After security authentification, Alice and Bob gain the raw key [1] .
In practice, a QKD system is optical. An optical QKD system includes the photon sources, quantum channels, single-photon detectors, and quantum random-number generators. In principle, optical quantum cryptography is based on the use of single-photon Fock states. However, perfect single-photon sources are difficult to be realized experimentally.
Practical implementations rely on faint laser pulses in which photon number distribution obeys Poissonian statistics. Then a small part of the pulses may contains more than one photons. In this case, Eve can get benefit from the multiphoton pulses by using photon number splitting (PNS) attacks [2] . If the quantum channel losses is high enough, Eve can obtain full of Alice's information without being detected.
It has been proved that Eve's PNS attacks can be bated by using decoy state protocols [3] [4] [5] . Such decoy state protocols can be modified with Bob's photon-number-resolving ability.
In this paper, we present a detailed discussion on the photon-number-resolving decoy state (PDS) protocol. A lower upper bound of the information Eve can gain by using PNS attack is verified. This upper bound is irrespective of the losses of the quantum channel, so that the PDS protocol can be utilized no matter how high the channel losses are. We obtain the optimal information Eve can gain by using the coherent multiphoton pulses (CMP) attacks.
Finally, we discuss that our scheme is optimal experimentally.
II. PHOTON-NUMBER-RESOLVING DECOY STATE PROTOCOL
In present QKD experiments, the photon sources are weak coherent sources and the quantum channels are noisy and lossy. Efficiency of single-photon detectors is low. Furthermore, the receiver can not resolve the photon number of an arriving signal in practice. In order to be secure in QKD, Eve's ability only can be limited by the laws of quantum mechanics,
i.e., Eve may have a lossless channel and she can achieve the photon number of a photon pulses without disturbing the qubit Alice encoded. She first measures the photon number of an arriving pulse. If she finds there are more than one photons in the pulse, she captures one of them and forwards the others to Bob through her lossless channel. This is Eve's PNS attacks. If the quantum channels Alice and Bob use are lossy enough, Eve can obtain full of Alice's information without being detected. In order to beat Eve's PNS attack, we will present a PDS protocol below.
A. Photon number statistics
At present, practical "single-photon" sources rely on faint laser pulses. Photons in the pulses Alice sent is a priori in coherent states | √ µe iθ >. But anyone outside Alice's laboratory has no knowledge of θ. So the photon states they get will be ρ = dθ 2π
This state is equivalent to the mixture of Fock state n P n |n >< n| , where
where n is the photon number in the pulses, and µ is the average photon number in them.
Assume that single-photon transmission efficiency is η. In order to be general, we assume that η not only includes the quantum channel transmission efficiency, but also includes the detection efficiency of Bob's single-photon detectors. Eve can control the quantity η perfectly, e.g., she may have a quantum channel with η Eve = 1. With the transmission efficiency η, photons Bob received will obey a different distribution of Poissonian statistics
Obviously,
. Thus, Eve can take use of lossy quantum channel, she replaces the lossy channel with a perfect one and hide the errors caused by her attack in the loss. If
Bob's detection apparatus can not resolve the photon number of an arriving signal, Eve can block a fraction b of the single-photon signals only to match the vacuum signals through the noisy quantum channel [2] . In this way photon number in the pulses obtained by Bob does not obey the poissonian statistics again
Then if
, Eve will hide all her eavesdropping in the transmission loss. This lead to the expression
If the transmission efficiency η = 1, Eve can not use this trick. However, if b match = 1, Eve can block all the single photon pulses. That is, Eve can obtain full of Alice's information in this way. However, if Bob can distinguish the photon number of the multiphoton pulses, he will find out that the photon number in the detected pulses does not obey poissonian statistics again. In order to match Bob's photon number statistics, Eve may implement an attack scheme as follow. She blocks a fraction c 1 of the single photon pulses. And she captures a photon with a fraction c 2 from the two-photon pulses. Then she splits one photon with a fraction c 3 from three-photon pulses, and so on. The resulting photon number statistics in Bob's detection apparatus are that
In this way, we can obtain the the following equations,
Solutions for c i are that
Consequently, even if Bob can achieve the photon number of the multiphoton pulses, Eve can gain some information without being detected in the way described above. Without the decoy pulses, the sufficient condition that Eve can get benefit from the PNS attack is that
where f (m, k) is the probability of that Eve forwards k photons to Bob and stores the other
photon-number-resolving decoy state protocol
In order to avoid Eve's PNS attack, Alice can introduce a decoy source to ensure the security of her QKD. In our PDS QKD scheme, Bob's detection apparatus is sensitive to the photon number of an arriving signal ( See FIG.1.) . The signal photon source obeys the distribution of another distribution of poissonian statistic with the average photon number µ s in the photon pulses
Also, the decoy photon source obeys the distribution of poissonian statistics with the average photon number µ d in the photon pulses
Assume that the single-photon transmission efficiency of Alice and Bob's quantum channel is η. Photon number statistics in Bob's detection apparatus are that
Consider the presence of Eve. The essence of decoy state are that Eve can not distinguish signal pulses from decoy pulses. Thus, we can obtain that
Let us assume that e −µ = 1 − µ + O(µ 2 ). When n = 0, j = 1, we can obtain that f (1, 0) = 1 − η. That is, Eve will block the single photon pulse with the probability 1 − η to match Bob's photon number statistics n = 0. Next, let us assume that n = 1, and
Then we can obtain that f (2, 1) =
.
Step by step,
we can obtain that
In physics, such solutions just correspond to that Eve blocks every photon with the probability 1 − η, i.e., she forwards every photon with the probability η through her lossless channel.
Obviously, such solutions are independent on the photon sources. Thus, the unique PNS attack scheme Eve can use in PDS protocol is that she blocks every photon with the probability 1 − η, no matter single photon pulses or multiphoton pulses it belongs to.
C. photon-number-resolving detection apparatus and quantum bit error rate
The photon-number-resolving detection apparatus has been presented experimentally [6] .
However, in practical QKD experiments, QBER of multiphoton pulses should also be considered. In Fig.1 , we present a detection apparatus which allows the receiver to achieve both the photon number and the QBER of the multiphoton pulses. The photon number resolving power is approximate to O(1/N), where N is the number of the beam splitter. In order to detect Eve's photon number splitting and resending (PNSR) attack, Alice and Bob should have the ability to obtain the QBER of the multiphoton pulses. In fact, QBER is composed of two parts,
where e dark is the rate of dark count in the single-photon detectors and e Eve is the QBER caused by Eve. The dark background rate e dark is 10 −5 typically. The probability that Bob detected a multiphoton pulses is about ηµ/2 (typically 10 −3 ∼ 10 −4 ). Then we can obtain the optimal number of BS when e is minimal, d(Ne dark + ηµ/2N)/dN = 0, i.e., N 10.
III. COHERENT MULTIPHOTON PULSE ATTACKS
We have shown that Eve's PNS attack could be perfectly limited by using PDS protocol.
Another question is that Eve can obtain more information from the multiphoton pulses than from single-photon pulses with the same QBER. A general attack scheme Eve may use is coherent multiphoton pulses attack. Eve attaches her probes with every photon in the pulses first. Then Eve interacts her probe with the photon unitarily. After that she sends the pulses to Bob. After Alice and Bob's public announcements, Eve performs a coherent measurements on her probes. Thus, the optimal eavesdropping strategy Eve may use can be described as follow: Eve first implements PNS attack on the quantum channel with the probability 1 − η. She implements SI attack on the single photon pulses and performs a CMP attack on the multiphoton pulses.
A. symmetric individual attack
When a single-photon pulse propagates from Alice to Bob, Eve can let a system of her choice, called a probe, interact with the single-photon pulse. Eve can freely choose the probe and the initial state. But her interaction must obey the laws of quantum mechanics.
That is, her interaction must be described by a unitary operator. After the interaction, Eve forwards the photon to Bob. Eve will perform measurement on her probe to draw Alice's information after Alice announces the basis she used. If Alice sends the state |x , the result may be written as
where |X is the entangled state of the probe and the photon [7] . Likewise, we can obtain the state |Y , |U and |V corresponding | ↓ , | → and | ← , respectively. In SI attack scheme, one can obtain that
where F is the fidelity of the state and F + D = 1. From the unitarity of the interaction, we have
The maximal information Eve can gain on this occasion is that
where h(x) = −x log 2 x − (1 − x) log 2 (1 − x) and D is QBER.
B. coherent multiphoton pulse attack
In Eve's CMP attack scheme, she attaches her probes with the photons in the multiphoton pulse one-to-one. Then she interacts the probe-photon pair unitarily and then forwards the pulse to Bob. She measures the probes coherently after Alice's announcements. This can be described as
where
, and |X ⊗n = |X ...|X n . Likewise, one can obtain |Y ⊗n , |U ⊗n and |V ⊗n . Suppose Alice announces that | ↑ , | ↓ basis has been used.
It has that
Then the two density operators that Eve must distinguish are
The optimal information Eve can gain from these two states can be obtained as follow:
Eve first performs the measurements on her probes. If her measurement results are that
, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n−1, then Eve know that her density operator 
The maximal probability that Eve can distinguish ρ ↑ from ρ ↓ correctly is that
Thus, the maximal information Eve can gain is that
That is, when Eve uses the coherent multiphoton pulses attack scheme, optimal information she can gain is I CM P .
IV. SECURE FINAL KEY
In GLLP [8] , it has been shown that the secure final key of BB84 protocol [1] can be extracted from sifted key at the asymptotic rate
where e is QBER found in the verification test and ∆ is the probability of the multiphoton pulses which are used to generate the final key. This means that both the QBER e and the fraction of tagged signals ∆ are important to generate the secure final key.
It has been shown that Eve's optimal PNS attack is that she splits every photon with the probability p = 1 − η when the PDS scheme is used. The probability of that a twophoton pulse that will be used to generate the final key is that 2η(1 − η). Since most of the multiphoton pulses are two-photon pulses, we can obtain that the fraction of tagged pulses which will be implemented to generate the final key is that
Thus, the upper bound of the fraction of the multiphoton pulses is µ, no matter how high the channel loss is. Thus, we can estimate the rate of the secure final key
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have theoretically discussed the PDS protocol. A lower bound of the tagged signal ∆ has been obtained. It has been shown that such upper bound can not be reduced as long as the quantum channel is noisy. We have discussed Eve's CMP attack.
The optimal information Eve can gain using her CMP attack has been obtained.
In our PDS QKD protocol, when the security of the QKD is ensured, both decoy pulses and signal pulses can be used to generate the raw key. And a bigger intensity of the photon sources can be accepted. On the other hand, as long as we assume that Eve has a lossless quantum channel, she always can blocks every photon with the probability 1 − η. In this case, the upper bound of tagged signal can not be reduced any longer. Our PDS QKD scheme is optimal today.
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